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Child Care Was Challenging Before the
Pandemic
Child care is foundational to the economy. Without
it, many parents cannot work or reach their career
potential. As child care programs rapidly closed in
the COVID-19 pandemic, the degree to which work
is enabled by child care became obvious,1 particularly
for the 14 percent of workers parenting a child under
age 6.2 Analyses of data collected in May and June
2020 found that 13 percent of working parents lost a
job or reduced their hours due to a lack of child care.3
Today, the pandemic has made broadly evident
what was already clear to America’s parents, employers, and care providers: the nation’s early childhood
care system is fragile. Working parents face intersecting challenges as they seek high-quality, affordable care that is suitable for the ages of their children
and available when and where they need it. One in
four families paying for care spend more than 10
percent of their income on that care,4 well above the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’
suggested affordability threshold of 7 percent.5
Half of Americans live in a child care desert,6 where
access to formal quality care is essentially absent.
And for parents living in a remote place, working
nonstandard hours or having multiple young children, options are even more limited.
As pandemic-related strains to the child care
system unfold atop this shaky foundation, we outline
existing and new challenges, and we highlight possibilities for repairing the broken systems caring for
our nation’s youngest children.

High Operating Costs Make Child Care
Expensive for Parents, Unprofitable for
Providers
Despite the high cost to parents, licensed child care
providers of all sizes struggle to generate a profit.
For most child care programs, costs for space and
materials are fixed, although they are relatively
small in comparison to labor costs. Child care is a
labor-intensive field, requiring many staff to care for
children at mandated child-to-staff ratios, but the
wages of individual workers are low. Most programs
cannot afford to pay living wages, and benefits are
scarce, despite the need for highly credentialed staff.7
Revenue increases typically would have to come from
charging higher tuition, which would make many
more families unable to afford quality care.
This dichotomy of high costs for families and low
wages for workers derives from child care being a mostly
private-pay system with limited public contributions. One
outcome is high turnover as employees seek higher pay
outside the industry, often in the public school system.8
Child care sits in stark contrast to publicly funded education, where teachers are paid significantly more than child

		

2

F E DE R A L R E SE RV E BA N K OF B O STON

care workers, have greater job security, and are typically
offered benefits such as health insurance, paid sick leave,
and retirement plans.9 Tensions between the push toward
better-credentialed staff in the name of enhancing quality,
inequities between pay for early childhood and public
school educators, and high staff turnover have been bubbling toward a crisis for years.
These challenges pre-date the pandemic but have
been exacerbated by the recent months of economic
shutdown and health concerns. Many child care programs were forced to close at the onset of the pandemic, and others did so voluntarily out of concern
for the health of their workers and the families they
serve.10 As the economy reopens, four major concerns
are at the fore both for parents and providers.
First, although some programs received assistance through CARES Act funding and forgivable
Payroll Protection Program (PPP) loans, and though
many laid-off workers were eligible for enhanced
unemployment assistance, access has been uneven.
The challenges of navigating funding may have
been particularly acute for family child care, often
operated by mothers in need of care for their own
children and often without resources such as a wellconnected board or employees with business acumen. For some, language barriers may have made
accessing funds even more complex.
Second, for some programs staff shortages may be
a pressing issue. Some child care workers ineligible
for unemployment or seeking the security of a job
may have found work elsewhere, though the extent of
this is unknown and may be small given the scarcity
of jobs and health concerns. Others may be unable
to return to work if schools remain closed and their
own children need care, or if they have concerns for
their own health that preclude their return to a highexposure environment like child care. On the other
hand, the loosening of the labor market and changes
in parent demand (discussed below) may counteract
these shortages; the full extent of staffing concerns is
still unknown and will take time to unfold.
Third, for center-based programs, facility costs like
rent and insurance have continued to accrue, even
without an inflow of tuition. And for those that have
remained consistently open, dwindled enrollment may
not have been enough to offset ongoing costs. Taken
together, at least some child care programs were unable
to stay viable and have shuttered their doors for good.

Finally, for programs that have remained afloat
and have reopened or will soon, surviving the shutdowns is not the end of their financial pressures. As
child care providers reopen, the ongoing health risks
have led the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) to recommend enhanced sanitization protocols and new restrictions on class sizes
(see below), all of which are keeping operation costs
high while reducing the number of families paying
tuition.11 Even programs that survived the closures
may not be able to continue operations.12

COVID-19’s Squeeze on Child Care Supply
Child care providers have been navigating a maze of possibilities in the pandemic, including whether and how to
reopen when allowed by state and local guidelines. The
CDC provides ongoing guidance for child care centers
that are open, including hygiene measures like handwashing and increased cleaning and instructions that staff and
children stay home when sick.13 Other considerations
include social distancing strategies such as reducing the
number of children and staff in a group, eliminating mixing between groups when possible, and spacing children
apart for naps and meals, along with screening and health
checks for all staff and children.14
The implications of these new precautions are
multiple. First, with guidelines around smaller group
sizes and the need for more physical distance between
children during indoor activities, existing facilities
cannot accommodate their usual enrollment capacities.15 A June 2020 survey of child care providers from
the National Association for the Education of Young
Children (NAEYC) found that 86 percent of respondents working in open programs said their program was
serving fewer children than before the pandemic, with
enrollment down an average of 67 percent.16 Second,
despite fewer children present, requirements for more
intensive cleaning and dividing children into separate
spaces, each needing adequate supervision, means staffing needs are still high. Finally, providers must procure
personal protective equipment, cleaning supplies,17 and
materials to support distancing between children (e.g.,
non-shared art and sensory supplies) generally without
new funds to offset these costs. Together, these new
realities translate into higher costs of operation for child
care programs, with fewer tuition dollars coming in to
support those costs. Although there are some federal
dollars flowing to child care now, these allocations are
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insufficient for many operators, and concerns exist about
continued viability when loans through the PPP expire
and CARES Act funding is exhausted by the end of the
year. Policies like continuing payment of subsidies and
parent co-payments to programs even when closed and
pay increases for workers are also temporary and not
enduring solutions.18
Nationally, it is unclear how long child care providers can sustain themselves without fuller external investments. In April, the Center for American
Progress extrapolated from provider data collected
by NAEYC in mid-March to estimate a loss of almost
4.5 million licensed slots—half of the already-inadequate nationwide supply.19 However, the NAEYC
data underlying the estimates were collected before
the CARES Act was passed,20 which along with the
PPP loans included Child Care Development Block
Grant funds to mobilize care for essential workers;
funding for the Educational Stabilization Fund, which
supports some state early education programs; and
additional Head Start allocations.21 Although some
providers reported that relief funds were difficult to
access or inadequate,22 it is yet unknown how estimated losses of slots might have been stemmed or
delayed by these funds. More recent data, however,
suggest these funds were not a panacea, and the June
child care provider survey from the NAEYC found
that only 18 percent of respondents expected their
program to survive longer than a year (note that this
sample was not random nor representative but did
include respondents from every state).23
At least one state has sought to quantify provider
losses. The Wisconsin Policy Forum found that 39 percent of its state’s licensed providers had closed by May
19,24 although it is not clear that these closures were
all permanent.25 In some hard-hit states like Arizona,
child care programs reopened, experienced a cluster
of COVID-19 cases, and closed again;26 some closed
indefinitely.27 In short, it is unknown to what extent
child care closures and losses will be sustained and to
what extent supply will be irrevocably changed.28
Absent additional support for the child care sector,
national supply of child care is likely to be dramatically
reduced overall, posing a distinct challenge to economic
recovery and creating hardship for the working parents of
young children and for the more than 1 million child care
workers (as of February 2020) who provide that care.29
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Demand for Child Care Is Likely to Change,
but How Is Largely Unknown
As the nation moved unevenly into stay-at-home
orders and then into various stages of phased re-openings, March and April’s job losses still have not been
fully recovered,30 with unemployment rates rising from
3.5 percent in February to 11.1 percent in June.31 Jobs
may eventually recover, but it could take years as many
businesses permanently shutter and the underlying
health situation persists.
For those who remain employed or who find new
work, it is not clear what demand for child care will
look like moving forward. However, the contributing
factors are varied and vast:
• High unemployment means fewer parents are
working, and until they return to work they are
unlikely to demand pre-pandemic levels of care.
However, the reverse is also true: until child
care is available to parents, they will face serious
challenges in returning to pre-pandemic levels
of work.
• With more workplaces transitioning to workfrom-home models, whether permanently or
not, parents may be able to arrange schedules to
stay at home with children during what used to
be usual daytime work hours, or to stagger their
hours with a co-parent and reduce demand for
care. Additionally, working from home may alter
the geography of child care needs, increasing
demand for care in residential areas rather than
areas closer to the workplace.
• Families who usually relied on informal care
from older relatives (e.g., grandparents) may find
themselves seeking more formal care than usual
to avoid compromising their relatives’ health.
• Families with school-age children may need
substantially more care than is typically available for this age group, given the uneven spread
of remote learning, hybrid learning with rotating in-person attendance, and possible closures
among schools that do re-open. This demand
will vary substantially at finely grained geographies, sometimes district-by-district, making it
difficult to quantify for now.
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• School delivery models may have implications for
younger children, too. If older children are not in
school, families who have younger children may
opt out of child care altogether, planning to stay
home, thereby pushing demand down.
• Families concerned about children’s socioemotional well-being may be especially eager to
return to structured routines and be back to
pre-pandemic demand levels.
• Until an effective vaccine is widely administered,
parents may be uncomfortable with the health
risks of sending children to child care. The
NAEYC reports that 72 percent of respondents
to their child care survey regularly heard from
their families that they aren’t comfortable sending their children back to care.
• Among those needing to use child care, demand
may shift to smaller in-home care or nanny/babysitter options, given greater potential viral exposure in center-based care.
• Finally, the pandemic has wrought changes in
individual families that are hard to quantify yet:
new constraints around work hours, transportation availability, disposable income, health status,
and informal supports may all shape child care
needs in ways that are both new and still fluid.
For example, early evidence indicates women’s
employment has declined more than men’s.32 It
is unclear the extent to which this is driven by
children’s care needs or industry/occupation, but
in any case it is likely many women may opt out
of employment until their young children enter
school, given new barriers to child care.

The Evolving Inequities of Child Care
Absent policy intervention and sizable investments,
access to formal child care slots is likely to become
elusive for all but the highest-income families during
traditional working hours. These families will still have
options, including accessing care through a nowhigher-priced center, or through in-home or nanny
care. Faced with a shrinking supply, it is possible that
more affluent families will increasingly leverage workrelated flexibilities or access care in different ways, like
through neighborhood co-ops, and perhaps desire less
formal care than before the pandemic.
Workers without this flexibility, however, will still
need child care at usual levels; as less-flexible jobs tend
to be lower paid, it is the workers who need care the
most who will be least able to afford it. This scenario
has major equity implications for lower-income parents’
ability to remain employed. Without systemic change,
we are likely to see widening disparities in child care
access across income and race-ethnicity, as well as disparities in parents’ ability to work across income, race/
ethnicity, and gender lines. Those who need lower-cost
options, flexibility, and nonstandard care—including
the front-line workers spotlighted by the pandemic, like
health, retail, and delivery workers—will be precluded
from access. Further inequities will be evident between
parents’ and childless adults’ abilities to reach their
labor market potential. Each calcifying disparity has
dramatic implications for how and to what extent we
can rebuild the economy.
TABLE 1. FACTORS INFLUENCING DEMAND FOR FORMAL
CHILD CARE

Table 1 summarizes the effect of these factors on
the demand for formal child care. The overall demand
is unclear now, and that ambiguity is likely to continue as the health crisis and the economic recession
persist. Lower demand may keep child care more
accessible in the short term, even with decreased
supply. But if parents are to eventually resume prepandemic labor force activity, it is unlikely that all,
particularly lower-earning workers, will be able to
generate alternative arrangements that do not involve
additional formal child care. At that point, demand
will increase and supply will be insufficient.
Note: Arrows indicate whether each factor is likely to increase (up) or decrease (down)
demand for formal child care.
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As higher operational costs and lower density
requirements continue, programs will deplete any
remaining savings and pass costs on to families, absent
outside assistance. Communities hardest hit by job
losses and populated with families who were already
struggling pre-pandemic and least able to pay for child
care tuition are the communities most likely to see
their local child care programs fold.33 Together, these
higher prices and restricted slots mean that access
to formal child care could increasingly become the
domain of families with the most resources.
Further, the shrinking numbers of child care providers don’t just affect families seeking care, but also the
workers who supply that care. Child care as an industry
lost 370,000 jobs between February and April 2020, less
than half of which had been recovered as of June 1.34
The industry is almost exclusively populated by women,
40 percent of whom are women of color. 35 Further,
within the industry, women of color (particularly Black
women) are more likely to work in assistant teacher roles
and with the youngest children,36 meaning that they
are likely to have been paid the least to begin with and
be among the least able to buffer these job losses with
savings and other resources. Even before the pandemic,
these workers were in a precarious economic situation
and, absent policy solutions, that precarity is likely to
continue, and be accompanied by the increased health
risks they face interacting with children and families
during the pandemic.

The Push to Improve Child Care
A sizable investment is required to stabilize and support the child care industry, as evidenced by countries
that have made this a priority.37 On July 29, 2020, the
U.S. House of Representatives passed the Child Care
Is Essential Act, which would allocate $50 billion
toward personnel, sanitation, training, and other costs
of operating child care programs in the pandemic.38
A companion bill in the Senate would fold child
care relief into broader education legislation.39 The
House also passed a second bill, the Child Care for
Economic Recovery Act, which includes $10 billion
for grants aimed at constructing or improving child
care facilities. This total of $60 billion in direct funding to the child care industry would be supplemented
with additional funding to provide care to children
of essential workers and to provide tax relief.40 These
allocations meet or exceed recommendations by
various industry experts, including the NAEYC,
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which called for $50 billion in March,41 and Senators
Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) and Tina Smith (D-MN),
who called for the same amount in April.42 A May
2020 op-ed from researchers at the Federal Reserve
Bank of Boston did not include a specific price tag,
but it urged policymakers “to be bold” 43 in thinking
about how to stabilize the child care industry and to
consider an increase in funding that could significantly change the child care system rather than just
return it to its pre-pandemic status. Finally, presumed
Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden recently
unveiled a $775 billion plan for supporting caregiving industries (both children and elders); it includes
tax credits and subsidies for lower-income families
paying for child care, tax incentives for businesses to
build onsite child care, universal pre-kindergarten,
and pay increases for early childhood educators.44
Identifying precisely how to best rebuild is a work
in progress. Because of the enduring challenges facing child care, efforts to restructure the industry and
broaden access to quality care pre-date the pandemic.
Most pre-pandemic plans targeted cost-related challenges, including a possible expansion of the child
and dependent care tax credit (enhancing the value
and making it refundable), to widen access for lowerincome households.45 Other approaches have included
setting affordability thresholds for families and providing free care to the lowest earners.46 The Trump
administration has also expressed interest in addressing the issue, providing a statement on its principles for
child care reform in December 2019.47 Aside from the
questions around funding and the high price tag of the
plans, questions raised at the time around disadvantages for families who prefer non-licensed care (e.g.,
relying on a relative or a stay-at-home parent)48 take
on increased salience in the pandemic context.
The current push to support existing child care
programs with infrastructure improvements and more
training and better wages for providers is a positive
step in addressing some of the most pressing challenges
described above. However, child care slots are not evenly
distributed, and increasing access for families in places
facing shortages of quality slots pre-pandemic—including in rural places, low-income neighborhoods, and in
some communities of color49—is not an easy task. Many
of the challenges driving pre-pandemic slot shortages
are likely to remain relevant barriers post-pandemic;
for instance, in rural America, staffing existing and
new child care centers may be a challenge in an aging
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workforce50 that is at higher risk of COVID-19-related
mortality.51 In any attempt to rebuild and improve the
child care industry, efforts to target inequity in access
will need to be made explicit to avoid reinforcing old
disparities. One area in particular need of attention is
the availability of quality care outside of standard work
hours. Low-wage service-sector workers, disproportionately women and people of color,52 must navigate
the compounding challenges of low-wage work and the
need to secure child care during off hours. Importantly,
any efforts to fully engage families with child care
and work will have to account for the new realities of
pandemic life. These include families’ newly developed
preferences and constraints, the looming possibility
of openings and re-closings due to viral spread, and,
importantly, the need to deal with children and families
who may have faced serious hardship and trauma in the
preceding months.53
Whether families are struggling with the losses of a
difficult economy or the benefits of increased workplace
flexibility, 54 having the support of a quality, safe, affordable child care slot is key to rebuilding the economy.
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